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Abstract
We introduce a new numerical framework to learn optimal
bidding strategies in repeated auctions when the seller uses
past bids to optimize her mechanism. Crucially, we do not
assume that the bidders know what optimization mechanism
is used by the seller. We recover essentially all state-of-the-
art analytical results for the single-item framework derived
previously in the setup where the bidder knows the optimiza-
tion mechanism used by the seller and extend our approach
to multi-item settings, in which no optimal shading strate-
gies were previously known. Our approach yields substantial
increases in bidder utility in all settings. Our approach also
has a strong potential for practical usage since it provides a
simple way to optimize bidding strategies on modern market-
places where buyers face unknown data-driven mechanisms.
Introduction
Repeated auctions are widely used in modern economic sys-
tems to sell a variety of items ranging from wireless spec-
trum licenses to ad placements on the Internet. In online
marketplaces, most auctions are designed using techniques
at the junction of classical auction theory [23] and statisti-
cal learning theory. Sellers take advantage of the enormous
amount of data gathered on buyers’ behavior and strategies
- through billions of auctions a day - to learn and implement
revenue maximizing auctions on different platforms.
In the case of single-item auctions, the design of an op-
timal incentive-compatible revenue-maximizing auction is
well understood [23], assuming the seller knows the value
distribution of each buyer. Indeed, under this perfect knowl-
edge assumption, she can define the allocation and payment
rules maximizing her expected revenue.
The multi-item framework is more intricate. Myerson’s
fundamental result has been extended to specific settings de-
pending on the number of objects and on the properties of
the bidders’ utility functions [4, 20, 11, 34]. A general and
analytical optimal auction in the multi-item framework has
yet to be found.
Because of the amazingly large variety of different set-
tings, automatic mechanism design has been introduced
to provide a (numerical) framework for learning revenue-
maximizing mechanisms satisfying constraints chosen by
the designer [9, 1]. This framework was recently comple-
mented by the introduction of neural networks for differ-
ent instances of the multi-item problem [13, 30, 15]; as
expected, it does take advantage of the large expressivity
power of neural networks architectures.
This line of research still traditionally assumes that the
value distributions of bidders are known to the seller. How-
ever, in practice, the seller does not have access to such in-
formation and can only statistically estimate these distribu-
tions using a finite sample of bids made in past (hopefully
truthful) auctions [26, 8, 22, 17, 6]. To simplify the presen-
tation, we can represent this as a two-stage game between a
seller and buyers. The first stage consists in a sequence of
truthful auctions (say, second price auctions without reserve
price or with random reserve prices) where bidders are as-
sumed to bid truthfully. This will provide the seller with a
batch of i.i.d. samples from the different value distributions
(since, in truthful auctions, observed bids are equal to un-
observed values). Under this - quite strong - truthfulness
assumption, the seller can compute the empirical revenue-
maximizing auction, based on the bid samples collected in
the first stage [27, 21, 29, 12].
However, bidders might have been strategic in the first
round, in order to maximize their long-term utility. Indeed,
strategically shading bids during the first round can and will
induce the seller to select another mechanism for the second
stage (the one that maximizes her revenuewith respect to the
distribution of bids instead of the real distribution of values).
This alternative mechanism might actually be better for the
seller than the one selected under truthful bidding. The main
idea is that a buyer might want to lose some money during
the first round to increase - drastically - his revenue during
the second one.
Several approaches have been introduced for the seller
to disincentive bidders from being strategic. A solution is
to compute the reserve price of a bidder using information
stemming solely from the other ones [5, 18, 14]. This ap-
proach is theoretically sound, but practically limited as it
requires that bidders have similar value distributions. For in-
stance, it cannot handle heterogeneous settings with a domi-
nant buyer [14] as the optimal reserve price of the latter can
not be computed from bids of the others. Unfortunately, this
is precisely the scenario where revenue optimizing mecha-
nisms unveil their full potential. Another line of research as-
sumes that bidders value the future a lot less than the seller
[3, 16] by considering discount factors of different magni-
tude orders. Although necessary to theory, this technique in-
troduces an artificial asymmetry between bidders and seller
in order to force bidders to bid truthfully in the seller learn-
ing phase (or at least during a significant fraction of it).
All these limitations were recently overcome by assum-
ing that bidders actually adapt to automatic mechanisms in
single-item auctions by being strategic in the first stage [31,
24, 25] . A new class of skewing or shading strategies was
introduced for the lazy second price auction with monopoly
reserve prices, and for the Myerson auction [31, 24]. In par-
ticular, a new variational approach was recently discovered
[25]. It unlocks, through numerical optimization, a method
to find best-responses to most of the approximatedMyerson
auction, such as boosted second price auctions. The major
and prohibitive drawback of these approaches is that they
require that strategic bidders perfectly know the underlying
mechanism design problem (i.e. the revenue maximization
problem) solved by the seller.
Framework and contributions
Our starting point is a recent end-to-end learning approach
[13] which might be first general attempt to learn revenue-
maximizing auctions in various multi-item settings. This ap-
proach assumes that the seller can somehow generate sam-
ples from the value distributions of the bidders to update
her mechanism. The mechanism is then parametrized by two
neural networks corresponding respectively to the two rules,
allocation and payment, that define a mechanism. These net-
works are trained to maximize the revenue of the seller under
the incentive compatibility constraint.
This approach is interesting, from a theoretical perspec-
tive, to surmise the potential performance of a revenue-
maximizing auction in settings where no optimal mecha-
nisms are known. It can also be used in practice by sellers
who have access to a large set of truthful bids to compute an
appropriate mechanism.
Here again, the main practical limitation lies in the fact
that bidders might be strategic and submit skewed bids, thus
altering the distribution of observations of the seller and
inherently affecting her mechanism updates (based on those
bids), which ultimately leads to a change of the output of
the game. Inspired by the recent line of work that focuses
on possible adversarial attacks on standard learning systems
[28], we aim at exploring manipulation opportunities for
bidders in such learning approaches [7, 35]. The auction
framework offers a nice sandbox to test new learning
approaches in multi-agent games. From a game-theoretic
standpoint, we simply cast the overall interaction between
players as a Stackelberg game where bidders play first -
hence are leaders -, and the seller is the follower, playing
second. We emphasize here that we do not assume that
bidders know the rules/algorithms/processes used by the
seller to optimize her revenue; instead they discover them
through a classic explore-exploit trade-off.
Our contributions are the following. We introduce a
new numerical framework to study economic interactions
when several agents use learning algorithms based on data
provided by other rational agents. We focus specifically on
how bidders can find good bidding strategies when facing
mechanisms such as those introduced by [13]. We improve
on recent single-item approach [25], by removing the prior
knowledge on the exact algorithmic procedure used by the
seller to optimize her mechanism.
Inspired by reinforcement learning techniques, we intro-
duce an exploration policy corresponding to a distribution
over possible strategies and use classical policy optimiza-
tion algorithms to tune the parameters of our policy. Further-
more, our approach elicits new shading strategies in classi-
cal and cutting-edge settings of the multi-item literature. For
instance, we obtain a 54% uplift in utility in the 2 bidders
and 2 objects framework with one strategic bidder, where
bidders have additive valuations and uniform value distribu-
tions between 0 and 1. This constitutes a first benchmark of
the impact of strategic behavior on multi-item revenue max-
imizing auctions’ performances. The implementation of our
experimental setup in PyTorch is also available on Github
for reproducibility concerns.
Auction design and Stackelberg games
Classical mechanism design literature usually studies the
Stackelberg game where the seller is the leader, and chooses
a mechanism knowing the bidders’ value distributions [10].
We assume that the seller does not have prior knowledge of
bidders’ value distributions and consider the reverse Stack-
elberg game where the bidders are leaders. Bidders are able
to choose what value distribution to submit and thus impact
the mechanism chosen by the designer.
Notations
We consider the setting with a set of n bidders and m items
with M “ t1, . . . ,mu. We denote by vi : t0, 1u
M Ñ Rě0
the valuation function of bidder i. For any bundle of items
S ĎM , vipSq represents howmuch bidder i values the bun-
dle S. As classically done in the auction literature, we as-
sume that bidders’ valuations are drawn independently from
value distributions that we denote by tFiuiPv1,nw. We denote
by F “ F1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Fn their product distribution.
A bidding strategy βi : R
2
m
Ñ R2
m
is a mapping from val-
ues to bid. We denote β “ pβ1, . . . , βnq and write β´i the
set of strategies without that of bidder i. The bid distribu-
tion FBi is the distribution of bids induced by using βi on
Fi. We denote by ~bi the vector of bid submitted by bidder i
and B “ tp~b1, . . . , ~bnq, ~bi P R
2
m
u the set of all possible bid
profiles.
A mechanism is a pair m “ pa, pq consisting of an
allocation rule ai : B Ñ t0, 1u
2
m
and a payment rule
pi : B Ñ R
2
m
ě0. For bids
~b “ p~b1, . . . ,~bnq, aip~bq gives the al-
location of the items, pip~bq the payment for each bidder and
uip~bq “ aip~bqpxi ´ pip~bqq the utility of bidder i.
The seller’s revenue in an auction pa, pq given bidding
strategies tβiuiPv1,nw is defined as
Rpm,βq “ EF
ˆÿ
j
ajp ~B1, . . . , ~Bnqpjp ~B1, . . . , ~Bnq
˙
where ~Bi “ βip ~Xiq and ~Xi is randomly drawn from Fi. The
utility of bidder i is defined as :
Uipm,βq “ EF
ˆ”
Xi ´ pip ~B1, . . . , ~Bnq
ı
aip ~B1, . . . , ~Bnq
˙
We will denote by βId the truthful strategy corresponding
to a player bidding his own valuation.
Classical seller’s learning problem
We write the seller’s mechanism optimization problem as a
learning problem following methods introduced by the au-
tomated mechanism design literature. Indeed, several works
investigate methods for learning optimal mechanisms from
data sampled from bidders’ true value distributions, using
numerical optimization and machine learning techniques.
In the classical framework, the seller seeks to solve the
constrained optimization problem consisting of maximizing
her revenue under the ex-post incentive compatibility con-
straint.
Definition 1 (DSIC) A mechanism m is ex-post dominant
strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) if bidding truthfully is
a dominant strategy, i.e,
@i P v1, nw, Uipm,βi, β´iq ď Uipm,βId, β´iq
An automatic mechanism design algorithm A takes a class
of mechanisms M and the bidders’ value distributions as
inputs, and outputs a mechanism solving a given constrained
optimization problem.
The problem of automated mechanism design as first in-
troduced by [9] and implemented in practice by [26] essen-
tially consists in a Stackelberg game where the seller takes
bidders’ value distributions as given, and enforces them to
bid truthfully by choosing a DSIC mechanism. This first
type of Stackelberg game takes the seller as leader.
Definition 2 (Seller/Bidder Stackelberg game)
(Stackelberg) Game in which the seller chooses a mech-
anism among a class of DSIC mechanisms M which
maximizes her revenue assuming she knows the bidders’
value distributions.
From this game, we can define the seller’s learning algo-
rithm A solving this Seller/Bidder Stackelberg game. If we
denote by F a class of value distributions andM a class of
mechanisms, a seller’s learning algorithmA is defined as
A : F Ñ M
F ÞÑ mpF q “ arg max
mPM
Rpm,βIdq
s.t. Uipm,βi, β´iq ď Uipm,βId, β´iq,
@i P v1, nw,@βi,@β´i
By assuming that the bidders’ value distributions are com-
mon knowledge, Myerson analytically solved this Stackel-
berg game in the one-item, multiple bidders setting in his
seminal paper [23].
We consider the approach taken by [13] for the imple-
mentation of the seller’s optimization process. Their work
provides a general algorithmic approach to approximately
solve this problem in multi-item, multi-bidder settings. The
seller’s auction is parametrized by a weight vector ω corre-
sponding to two neural networks which take bids for each
item and each player (n ˆ m entries) as inputs and return
respectively the allocation probability aω of each item, for
each player (nˆm outputs) and the payment for each player
pω (n outputs). In the case of combinatorial auctions, bid-
ders would submit a bid for each possible bundle (n ˆ 2m
entries).
The first term of the loss function used to train the network
is the negated empirical revenue computed on the dataset of
bids S “ t~bp1q, . . . ,~bpLqu,
LRev “ ´
1
L
Lÿ
k“1
pωp~b
pkqq
To ensure the IC constraint, the authors use two different
approaches. The first one is a hard constraint implemented
by defining an architecture which is DSIC by design. My-
erson’s lemma [23] is used to design the MyersonNet archi-
tecture which learns the optimal DSIC auction in the single-
item setting. However, for each new setting of the problem,
a new architecture must be designed as shown in [30].
Their second approach, the RegretNet architecture, uses
a soft constraint in a Lagrangian corresponding to the
incentive-compatibility objective. For each bidder, they in-
troduce the empirical ex post regret for bidder i :
yrgtipωq “ 1
L
Lÿ
l“1
max
~bmis
i
uωi p
~bmisi ,
~b
plq
´iq ´ u
ω
i p
~b
plq
i ,
~b
plq
´iq
This regret is the difference between the maximum util-
ity bidder i can get by optimizing his misreport ~bmisi and
the utility he gets when bidding truthfully. They use the
augmented Lagrangian method to optimize the Lagrangian
function defined as:
Lpω, λq “ LRev `
Nÿ
i“1
λiyrgtipωq ` ρ
2
ˆ Nÿ
i“1
yrgtipωq˙2
This Lagrangian function is the sum of the negated actual
revenue of the mechanism with two penalties which quan-
tify the lack of incentive compatibility, thus insuring that
the learned mechanism is approximatively DSIC. The mis-
reports ~bmisi are not optimized assuming that the bidders
consider that their bids have an impact on the mechanism
learned by the seller. This is why the networks learned fol-
lowing this approach only satisfies a DSIC constraint and are
not robust to an attack from a strategic bidder optimizing his
global bid distribution.
Adversarial bidder attack
In practice, the fact that the seller uses past bids to estimate
bidders’ value distributions before optimizing her mecha-
nism in repeated auctions provides bidders with the oppor-
tunity to design “attacks” in order to find bidding strategies
that increase their long-term utility. By strategically adjust-
ing their bids, they are able to control the bidding distribu-
tions perceived by the seller and used to optimize her mecha-
nism. This corresponds to a new Stackelberg game in which
the bidders are the leaders of the game, which is the focus of
our work here.
Definition 3 (Bidder/Seller Stackelberg game) [31, 25]
Stackelberg game in which strategic bidders assume the
existence of a seller’s learning algorithm A. Each strategic
bidder i chooses a strategy βi that induces a (pushforward)
bid distribution FBi “ βi#Fi used as input by the seller’s
algorithm. The goal of the strategic bidder is to optimize
arg max
βiPBi
UipApFBi , F´iq, βiq
An adversarial “attack” consists in solving the bidder/seller
Stackelberg game by finding a bidding distribution that in-
creases bidders’ utility for a specific seller’s learning algo-
rithm. If we denoteBi the set of possible strategies for bidder
i, an adversarial attack ΠipAq for a seller’s learning algo-
rithm A is defined as following:
ΠipAq : F Ñ Bi
F ÞÑ ΠipF q “ arg max
βiPBi
UipApFBi , F´iq, βiq
Several approaches have already tackled this problem
[31, 24, 25]. In all these papers, the authors assume perfect
knowledge of the optimization algorithm used by the seller.
Our goal is to extend these approaches by getting rid of the
assumption that bidders know the seller’s algorithm and by
proposing a method that automatically adapts to this new
framework.We provide a general method that applies in par-
ticular to general multi-item auctions, and hence to cutting
edge auction theoretic results. For these auctions, allocation
and payment rules are currently available only through nu-
merical methods such as the one developed by [13], which
preclude the design of attacks based on analytic understand-
ing of auction rules. We provide a general approach to de-
signing such attacks, proving that the networks introduced
by [13] are not robust to adversarial attacks.
These adversarial “attacks” could be called Stackelberg
responses to black-box automatic mechanism design. They
exploit a conceptual opening in most automatic mechanism
design works, i.e. the breakdown of incentive compatibility
for the buyer when the seller optimizes over incentive com-
patible auctions. As such, they differ from standard adver-
sarial attacks in e.g. computer vision, which generally rely
on the lack of local robustness of a classifier. Two other fea-
tures are notable: these “attacks” do not necessarily yield
lower revenues for the seller [24]; and they are also part of a
dynamic game between buyers and seller and as such have a
dynamic component that is absent from classical and static
machine learning frameworks, such as image classification.
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Figure 1:General architecture for adversarial learning in
revenue-maximizing auctions.. The green box corresponds
to the strategic bidder’s parameters, the red box corresponds
to the parameters that the seller can optimize. The figure rep-
resents three bidders with one strategic bidder optimizing
his bidding strategy. The two others (top left in Figure) bid
truthfully, so their bids are their values.
The single-item auction
We show how to numerically solve the bidder/seller Stackel-
berg game where one strategic bidder is the leader. They use
a zero-order optimization algorithm enabling them to opti-
mize their utility without needing to know or access the op-
timization algorithm used by the seller to learn her mecha-
nism.
Our architecture
For the single-item setting, we consider the MyersonNet ap-
proach introduced in [13]. The allocation rule is defined as
an invertible neural network parametrizing a transformation
of the bid. The payment rule is obtained in such a way that
the auction is DSIC following theMyerson lemma. This pro-
vides a first benchmark on how seller learning algorithms
are sensitive to adversarial attacks. We focus on one spe-
cific bidder and assume that the strategies of other bidders
are fixed. We show how the strategic bidder can optimize an
exploration bidding policy to increase his utility when the
seller is using a MyersonNet-type architecture to optimize
her selling mechanism.
Definition 4 (Exploration bidding policy) We consider a
set of possible bidding strategies B. An exploration bidding
policy π is a distribution over this set of strategies.
We first consider the case where B is the set of linear bid-
ding strategies because of their simplicity and wide use in
modern industrial bidding engines. To parametrize our ex-
ploration bidding policy, we use a normal distribution such
that
λ „ N pµ, σ2q “ πpµ, σ2q
with corresponding bidding strategy βλpxq “ λx for the
strategic bidder. We do not require any assumption on the
other bidders’ behavior.
According to the exploration policy, we sample several
shading parameters λ which are used as bid multipliers by
the strategic bidder. The goal of the strategic bidder is to op-
timize the parameters µ and σ2 to maximize his utility when
the seller is using the MyersonNet architecture. A represen-
tation of the global architecture is provided in Figure 1.
[24] introduced a class of functions performing well in
revenue-maximizing auctions. We also consider this class of
strategies in our experiments in a second time. The thresh-
olded strategies they introduced can be parametrized by
three parameters : the threshold r corresponding to the value
below which the virtual value [19, p. 68] is thresholded;
the slope a of the bidding distributions’ virtual value after
the threshold r; and the value ǫ of the virtual value before
r: in the case of a uniform value distribution, this gives a
bidding strategy parametrized such that the virtual value of
the bid distribution satisfies ψBpxq “ ǫ for x ă r and
ψBpxq “ ax´ r for x ě r:
βΛpxq “βr,a,ǫpxq
“ppap1 ´ rq{2´ ǫqp1 ´ rq{p1´ xq ` ǫq1px ă rq
` apx` 1q{p2arq1px ě rq .
We maintain a normal distribution with diagonal covariance
Σ over Λ “ pr, a, ǫq and optimize the exploration bidding
policy corresponding to this class of strategies. We show
that this results in a large increase in terms of utility for the
strategic bidder, without needing to know perfectly the opti-
mization procedure of the seller.
Our optimization procedure
We use the classical Reinforce algorithm [33] to optimize
the parameters Λ of the distribution. In the experiments, we
do not optimize the variance of the distribution (hence it
never tends to 0) to continue the exploration. In practice,
it makes the approach robust to any change in the seller’s
optimization procedure as the bidder never stops exploring.
If the goal were solely to find the optimal bidding strategies
by enabling the variance to converge to zero, we could use
classical evolutionary search algorithms such as NES [32] to
also optimize the variance of the distributions.
The optimization procedure is the following. The goal
of the algorithm is to maximize the expected utility of the
strategic bidder :
argmaxµPRUpµq “ EΛ„πpµ,Σq
ˆ
UpmpβΛq, βΛq
˙
where U is the strategic bidder’s utility and mpβΛq is the
mechanism resulting from a training where the neural net-
works take bids bi “ βΛpviq as inputs, and where vi is
sampled from Fi. We use the MyersonNet architecture for
the single-item case and the RegretNet architecture for the
multi-item setting. In both cases, they takes bids induced by
the shading strategy as inputs. We sample several shading
parameters according to the exploration bidding policy and
take a gradient step according to:
∇µUpµq “ EΛ„πpµ,Σq
ˆ
UpβΛq
∇µpµ,ΣpΛq
pµ,ΣpΛq
˙
.
with pµ,Σ the probability density function (henceforth pdf)
corresponding to πpµ,Σq. To compute UpβΛq we run a full
training of the MyersonNet architecture. The full procedure
is presented in Algorithm 1. All our implementations are
provided in Pytorch.
Algorithm 1: Adversarial training for revenue-
maximizing auctions
Input: Distributions F1, . . . , Fn, seller’s learning
mechanismA
Initialize µ1, Σ;
for t “ 1 to T do
Sample Λ1, . . . ,Λq „ N pµt,Σq;
for l “ 1 to L do
Run subroutineA to optimize seller’s
mechanism on bids induced by βΛi for bidder
i and βj “ βId,@j ‰ i ;
Compute strategic bidder’s utility:
UΛi “ UpApFBΛi , F´iq, βΛiq;
Compute gradient:
∇Upµtq “
1
L
řL
l“1 UΛi log
`
fN pµt,ΣqpΛiq
˘
;
Update: µt`1 Ð µt ´ ρt∇Upµtq ;
Experimental results
We consider the uniform distribution on r0, 1s since this is
the standard textbook example in auction design. We can
easily extend our approach to any other distributions. We
use σ2 “ 0.005 in our experiment to learn the linear shading
and Σ “ diagp0.005, 0.005, 0.005q to learn the parameters
of the thresholded exploration policy. To compute strategic
bidder’s utility and seller’s revenue, we sample bidding strat-
egy parameters according to the exploration bidding policy.
Our result are reported on Table 1.
For the setting with three bidders, we get an uplift of 20%
in terms of utility for the strategic bidder and a decrease of
9% in seller’s revenue with a simple linear shading policy.
It shows as expected that the MyersonNet architecture is not
robust to adversarial attacks from a strategic bidder. Interest-
ingly, with the thresholded strategies in the case of two bid-
ders, the exploration bidding policy leads to both a higher
utility for the strategic bidder and a higher revenue for the
seller than when using linear shading. This is the illustration
that the auction game is not a zero-sum game.
We compare the performance of our approach with several
natural baselines. The Vickrey-Clark-Gloves (VCG) auc-
tion corresponds to the second-price auction without reserve
price. This is a welfare-maximizing auction. It is possible
to get a higher utility for a strategic bidder when seller is
using a revenue-maximizing auction rather than a welfare-
maximizing auction. Indeed, Myerson reduces the competi-
tion when all the other bidders are bidding below their re-
Setup
Truthful VCG Truthful Myerson
Myerson
shading
Reinforce on MyersonNet
Truthful Linear shading Tresholded shading
utility revenue utility revenue utility utility revenue utility revenue utility revenue
Uniform, K=2 0.168 0.33 0.083 0.416 0.246 0.083 0.417 0.169 0.304 0.181 0.368
Uniform, K=3 0.083 0.500 0.057 0.531 0.131 0.057 0.530 0.100 0.46 0.115 0.495
Uniform, K=4 0.05 0.60 0.040 0.612 0.079 0.040 0.612 0.064 0.570 0.069 0.587
Table 1:All bidders have a uniform value distribution on r0, 1s. The strategic bidder is playing againstK´1 bidders who
are bidding truthfully. The seller is using theMyersonNet architecture as learning algorithm. To compute the performance
of the exploration policy, we average over q “ 50 strategies sampled from the exploration policy.
serve price. The strategic bidder takes advantage of this re-
duction of competition to increase his utility.
We also compare our method with the one recently intro-
duced by [25] for the Myerson shading method. Our ap-
proach in the present paper brings three conceptual improve-
ments. First, we are able to extend our approach to the multi-
item setting, which is not possible using [25]’s approach.
Moreover, our bidding policy is randomized as our goal is
to be robust to any change in the seller’s behavior. Finally,
we do not assume exact knowledge of the mechanism which
was the case in [25]. This explains why we do not recover
exactly the performance of [25], as they take advantage of
the knowledge of the exact implementation of the Myerson
auction.
We only provide experiments for less than 4 bidders since
the interest of revenue-maximizing auctions both in terms of
utility and revenue decreases dramatically with the number
of bidders when they all have symmetric value distributions.
This provides a first benchmark to design adversarial attacks
against sellers’ learning algorithms. This benchmark could
be extended in the near future by testing new seller algo-
rithms and new architecture to learn strategic behaviors. We
now show how our approach performs on more complex set-
tings from the multi-item auction literature where no good
shading strategies were previously known.
Extension to various multi-item settings
We present our experimental pipeline for designing adver-
sarial attacks in the multi-item setting.
Settings
We assume that the seller is using the RegretNet architec-
ture as introduced previously. We benchmark the impact of
a linear exploration policy on the RegretNet architecture and
see how the seller’s revenue is impacted by a strategic bidder
in the multi-item setting. We consider two classical settings
of the multi-item literature. We denote by Setting I the set-
ting with two items and two bidders with additive valuations
and uniform value distribution F1 “ F2 “ Upr0, 1s
2q; and
by Setting II the setup with two objects and three bidders
with additive valuations and value distribution F1 “ F2 “
F3 “ Upr0, 1s
2q. We consider the uniform value distribution
as this is the standard textbook example. Our approach can
be extended to any other distributions.
Experimental results
We implemented Algorithm 1 initializing µ1 to be an ar-
ray of m ones (corresponding to the thuthful strategy), and
σ2k “ 0.05 for all k P M . We run T “ 150 adversarial
training epochs, and sample q “ 12 lambdas per epoch.
We optimize the seller mechanism every 3 adversarial epoch
by training the RegretNet architecture. We implement the
RegretNet architecture in PyTorch by using two neural net-
works with H “ 2 hidden layers of size h “ 30.
Our experimental results are reported in Table 2. We observe
substantial improvements in bidders’ utility, with a 108%
uplift for Setting I and a 54% uplift for Setting 2. Shading
bids in the considered settings also generated important rev-
enue decreases for the seller : a 21% decrease for setting I
and a 5% one for setting II. This is the performance of the
exploration and it would be possible to improve the strategic
bidder’s utility by decreasing the variance of the exploration
policy at the cost of not being robust to changes of the learn-
ing mechanism.
Discussion
Using simple linear shadings in multi-item settings yielded
considerable improvements in bidders’ utility. This suggests
that even better improvements in utility could be found us-
ing more complex bidding strategies in the spirit of the
thresholded-virtual-value strategy introduced by [24] for the
single-item framework. Our work thus opens the door to
several natural extensions such as using neural networks to
parametrize more complex bidding strategies, or studying
other bidder types, valuation distributions and auctions such
as the combinatorial auction.
However, training neural networks to learn the exploration
policy would increase the running time of the procedure,
which is already substantial for linear shading strategies. We
plan to consider this line of improvements in future work.
Another way to increase the speed of our algorithm would
be to assume a model on the black-box used by the seller.
Assuming this prior would enable first-order method to in-
crease the speed of convergence. We could for instance de-
sign a bidding engine combining our approach and the one
from [25] to be both robust to changes in the selling mech-
anism and quickly learn a good strategy when sellers use
classical selling mechanisms such as the Myerson auction
or the eager second price auction with monopoly price.
Our numerical results give a concrete sense of how much
strategic bidders can improve their utility in comparison to
when they bid truthfully. This reinforces the idea that the
Setting
VCG RegretNet (truthful) RegretNet (adversarial)
utility revenue utility revenue utility revenue
Setting I :
two bidders, two objects 0.336 0.666 0.149 0.882 0.306 0.696
uniform value distribution
Setting II :
three bidders, two objects 0.166 1.000 0.096 1.034 0.148 0.985
uniform value distribution
Table 2: The strategic bidder is using a linear bidding exploration policy with parameter σ2k “ 0.05. The seller is using
the RegretNet architecture as selling mechanism. We run T “ 150 adversarial training epochs,and base our evaluation on
averaging over q “ 12 strategies from the exploration policy each epoch.
conceptual mistake of not treating the game where the seller
uses past bids to optimize the auction as a Stackelberg game
can be very costly for bidders. Moreover, they show that
data-driven automatic mechanisms are vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks, hence providing motivation for practical im-
plementation of adversarial attacks onmodernmarketplaces,
or implementation of automatized mechanisms robust to ad-
versarial attacks on these same platforms.
This is a first benchmark of how simple learning approaches
could help design adversarial attacks in revenue-maximizing
auctions. Future works may involve more complicated shad-
ing strategies and exploration policies, minimizing for in-
stance the risk of exploration as considered in the safe-
exploration learning framework.
A new framework to design robust
mechanisms
A natural extension to the design of adversarial attacks
against data-driven automated selling mechanisms is the de-
sign of learning algorithms which are robust to adversarial
attacks. This line of work has been initiated by [2], who find
mechanismswhich maximize the seller’s revenue against the
worst bid distribution in a certain class. To avoid dealing
with worst-case scenarii, an intermediate approach would be
to consider mechanisms robust to a class of bidding strate-
gies and a class of initial value distributions.
Definition 5 (ǫ adversarially-robust learning algorithm)
A selling learning algorithm is said to be ǫ adversarially-
robust for this class of value distributions, if for any value
distributions in this class, for any adversarial attack Π
RpΠq ď RpβIdq ` ǫ
This leads to a new definition of incentive compatible learn-
ing algorithms where bidders have an incentive to bid truth-
fully even if the seller is using past bids to optimize her
mechanism. Designing such new robust selling mechanisms
yields to solve a new Stackelberg game: the seller is the
leader and assumes a certain class of possible bidding strate-
gies for strategic agents to find the optimal learning mecha-
nism against such strategic agents.
A follow up on our work could be to investigate feasibil-
ity of such robust mechanisms by adding a constraint to an
augmented Lagrangian method similar to that used by [13].
Our approach is the first necessary step in the design of such
robust mechanisms since it computes how the seller’s rev-
enue is impacted when using a certain selling mechanism.
Training such meta-mechanisms will enable to quantify the
price for seller to use such ǫ adversarially-robust learning
algorithms.
Conclusion
We present a new way to design adversarial attacks against
cutting-edge automatic mechanism design algorithms. Our
approach yields very substantial utility gains for the strategic
bidder in our numerical experiments. This allows buyers to
quantify the price of revealing information about their values
in repeated auctions. This strengthens the balance of power
between buyers and seller on modernmarketplaces since our
practical approach can easily be plugged in modern bidding
engines. From a theoretical standpoint, this offers a new tool
to study economics interactions through an algorithmic lens
and represents a new step to reinterpret economics problems
as algorithmic learning problems between strategic agents.
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